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This privilege is properly extended only to
of aleoholic intoxication.
testimonial compulsion, for its purpose was to put an end to an early
practice of extracting incriminating. statements from accused persons.9
Another available theory is that the search became improper because of
the subsequent tort on the defendant by the officers. The idea is the same
as where officers legally searching a home unnecessarily destroy property, thus
committing a trespass, and the trespass is urged to make the whole search
invalid. This ab initio doctrine, however, is not approved by modern courts,
as the trespass itself is a sufficient basis for remedial action.'0
A more reasonable basis for excluding evidence of the type under
consideration would assume that torture of a man can be regarded as
something prohibited by the constitutional guarantees of due process of
law, and that since it is illegal to deprive a person of his right to due
process of law, evidence secured in such a manner is classifiable as illegally
obtained evidence. Most states have by now decided how to handle such
evidence, a substantial minority of them choosing to exclude it from the
trial.'1 For these latter courts, calling the use of the stomach pump a
violation of due process will accomplish the same result as calling it an
unreasonable search. Moreover, a consideration of the problem as a due
process question will focus attention upon the reasons for disapproving
of such practices: the elements of .pain or danger to the accused person.
CROSS-EXAMINING THE EXPERT WITNESS WITH THE
AID OF BOOKS
Sherwin Willens
[I]n matters of science the
reasonings of men of science can
only be answered by men of science."1
Lord Mansfield in Folkes v. Chadd.

With increasing frequency, as knowledge becomes channelized into
specialties, counsel must cope with the problem of cross-examining the
expert witness.2 Often it is advisable to forego cross-examining the competent and honest expert,3 but, unfortunately, not all experts are competent
8. See particularly Mamet, Constitutionality of Compulsory Chemical Tests to Determine
Atlcoholic Intoxication, 36 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 132 (1945) ; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2263
(1940).
9. See INBAU,

SELF-INCRIMINATION: WHAT CAN AN ACCUSED PERSON BE COMPELLED TO

Do? (1950).
10. McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95 (1927),

strictly limited this theory to tort

cases, disapproving its use as a basis for release of an accused. Its use as a means of adding
penalty damages to a tort recovery against the offending police officers is discussed in

Bohlen and Shulman, Effect of Subsequent Misconduct upon a Lawful 4rrest, 28 Col. L. Rev.
841 (1928).
11. 19 states follow federal rule of excluding illegally seized evidence: Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. 26 states reject it: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, New llampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
Yorl.. Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia.
1.
2.

3 Doug. 157 (1782).
Wellman, The Art of Cross-Examination 75 (4th ed. 1932) (estimated that in over

60% of the more important litigation, experts were called upon to testify).
3. Id. at 77.
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and honest; so, the crux of the examiner's problem is to neutralize the
expert's testimony by showing the jury that he is not qualified or that
he has misapplied his knowledge. One effective way of doing this is to
cross-examine him from standard books, pamphlets and articles (all hereafter referred to as books) in his field, thus pointing up the fact that his
purported expertness is not substantiated.
Although most state courts will not permit such cross-examination unless
the expert refers to a specific book or books,4 a substantial minority
rejects the requirement of reference and allows the examiner to use books
subject to the trial judge's discretion. 5 It is the purpose of this comment
to attempt an answer to the following questions: When may books be
used as an aid in cross-examining the expert? How may they be used
when their use is allowed? Why have many courts restricted their use?
Finally, is there a sound basis for restricting their use?
When Books May Be Used

At the outset, it should be noted that the courts do not draw a distinction
between civil and criminal cases in regard to the use of books on crossexamination. The majority of jurisdictions qualify the use of books on
cross-examination by a rather stringent rule 'of evidence known as the
rule of reference-that is, the expert must first have referred to the book
before the examiner may use it upon cross-examination. Actually, the
rule of reference is not one rule, but two.
The stricter version of this rule demands that the expert must have made a
specific reference to the book as corroborating his opinion or as a book upon
which he relied as a basis for the opinion he expressed. Under this stricter6
version, only the book referred to may be used on cross-examination.
Then, too, some of the courts which follow this version draw a distinction
between corroboration and reliance, a distinction which seems to depend
upon which phase of the examination, direct or cross, it is first established
that the expert is familiar with the literature in his field. If in his direct
testimony the expert states that his opinion is corroborated by a specific
book, he may be cross-examined from that book. But if the factor of
corroboration is established upon cross-examination, the trial-wise expert
4. Cases cited notes 6 and 8 infra.
5. Cases cited note 13 infra.
6. Fed.: Western Union v. Ammann, 296 Fed. 453 (3rd Cir. 1924); Cal.: Griffith v.
Los Angeles Pac. Co., 14 Cal. App. 145, 111 Pac. 107 (1910) ; Gluckstein v. Lipsett, 209 P. 2d
98 (Cal. App. 1948) ; Colo.: Baker v. People, 72 Colo. 68, 209 Pac. 791 (1922) ; Denver City
Tramway Co. v. Gawley, 23 Colo. App. 332, 129 Pac. 258 (1912) ; Del.: Drucker v. Philadelphia Dairy Products Co., 35 Del. 437, 166 Atl. 796 (1933) ;Fla.: Eggart v. State, 40 Fla. 527,
25 So. 144 (1899) ; IIl.: Wilcox v. Internat. Harvester Co., 278 II. 465, 116 N.E. 151 (1917) ;
Ullrich v. Chicago City R. Co., 265 Ill.338, 106 N.E. 828 (1914) ; City of Bloomington v.
516 (1878) (this
Shrock, 110 Ill. 219 (1834) ; Contra': Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 89 Ill.
case has never been overruled and has been cited in jurisdictions allowing complete use of
books. Thus, Illinois has the dubious distinction of being authority for opposite views);
Ind.: Louisville, New Albany & Chicago R. Co. v. Howell, 147 Ind. 266, 45 N.E. 584 (1896) ;
Hess v. Lowrey, 122 Ind. 225, 23 N.E. 156 (1889) ; Mass.: Percoco's Case, 273 Mass. 429,
173 N.E. 515 (1930) ; Commonwealth v. Phelps, 210 Mass. 109, 96 N.E. 69 (1911) ; Mich.:
People v. McKernan, 236 Mich. 226, 210 N.W. 219 (1926) (court plays a cat and mouse game
between examiner and expert; following appears: "In stating the stain was human blood in
his opinion and 'I think by the best authorities is so considered,' the witness unlocked the
door of exclusion, but counsel failed to lift the latch by naming the authorities he had in
mind"); People v. Vanderhoof, 71 Mich. 158, 39 N.W. 28 (1888) ; N.J.: State v. MacRorie,
86 N.J.L. 401, 92 At. 578 (1914) ; N.C.: State v. Summers, 173 N.C. 775, 92 S.E. 328 (1917) ;
Butler v. South Car. & G. Ext. R. Co., 130 N.C. 15, 40 S.E. 770 (1902) ; S.D.: State v. Sexton,
10 S.D. 127, 72 N.W. 84 (1897).
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may escape cross-examination from the book by stating that he did not rely
upon it in forming his opinion. In other words, when the expert corroborates his opinion as part of his direct testimony, reliance is taken for
granted; the same is not necessarily true when he corroborates his opinion
while being cross-examined.7
The less strict version of the rule of reference is that books may be
opinion and
used if the expert refers to books generally as sustaining his
the book used need not be a book referred to by the expert.8
In both versions it makes no difference whether the expert relies wholly
or partially upon a book. The important factor is some reliance. However,
the expert can avoid cross-examination from books by making an emphatic
statement that although he is familiar with the books in the field, he based
his opinion solely upon personal experience and observation.9 If he does
refer to a book, he may be cross-examined only on sections of the book
relevant to his testimony upon direct.' 0 For example, a doctor who testifies
as to the proper method for setting a broken leg, citing a book as corroboration, may be cross-examined from that book only to contradict his conclusion or to test his knowledge of bone setting, but not to test his
capabilities in the whole field of medicine. Another restriction upon the
cross-examiner in a few of the states following the rules of reference is
the requirement that the book be Used only to contradict the expert, and
not to test his knowledge upon the subject matter of his testimony. 1"
Taking the illustration given above, application of this restriction means
that if the expert's opinion is substantiated as to the manner of setting
a broken leg, the examiner cannot use the book even though the conclusion
in the book is reached by a reasoning process differing from that employed
by the expert.
The one important exception to the restrictive scope of the rules of
reference is that a book written by the expert himself may be used by the
examiner during cross-examination. This exception is based upon the rule
of evidence which allows the impeachment of a witness by his own prior
inconsistent statements. 12
7. Compare, Percoco's Case, 273 Mass. 429, 431, 173 N.E. 515 (1930) and DeHaan v.
Winter, 262 Mich. 192, 247 N.W. 151 (1933), with People v. McKernan, 236 Mich. 226, 210
N.W. 219 (1926) and People v. Vanderhoof, 71 Mich. 158, 39 N.W. 28 (1888).
8. Iowa: Wilcox v. Crumpton, 219 Iowa 389, 258 N.W. 704 (1935) ; State v. Blackburn,
136 Iowa 743, 114 N.W. 531 (1908) ; Cronk v. Railroad Co., 123 Iowa 349, 98 N.W. 884
(1904) ; Kan.: Stout v. Bowers, 97 Kan. 33, 154 Pac. 259 (1916) ; Minn.: Ruud v. Hendrickson, 176 Minn. 138, 222 N.W. 904 (1929) ; Wittenberg v. Onsgard, 78 Minn. 342, 81
N.W. 14 (1899); N.Y.: Hastings v. Chrysler Corp., 273 App. Div. 292, 77 N.Y. Supp. 2d
524 (1948). But ef. People v. Riccardi, 285 N.Y. 21, 32 N.E. 2d 776 (1914) ; N.D.: State v.
Burnette, 28 N.D. 539, 150 N.W. 271, rehearing granted, 28 N.D. 554, 150 N.W. 276 (1914)
(excellent attempt at reconciliation of conflict in cases) ; Vt.: Baldwin v. Gaines, 92 Vt. 61,
102 AtI. 338 (1917) ; Wis.: Bruins v. Brandon Canning Co., 216 Wis. 387, 257 N.W. 35
(1934).
9. Griffith v. Los Angeles Pac. Co., 14 Cal. App. 145, 111 Pac. 107 (1910); Baldwin v.
Gaines, 92 Vt. 61, 102 At. 338 (1917).
10. State v. Thompson, 127 Iowa 440; 103 N.W. 377 (1905) (murder: defense, insanity.
Medical expert could not be cross-examined from a book because statement in book merely
showed that author did not believe in defense of insanity) ; Hill v. Ross, 198 Minn. 199, 269
N.W. 396 (1936) (expert did not testify on subject matter of book).
11. Gluckstein v. Lipsett, 209 P. 2d 98 (Cal. App. 1948) ; Eggart v. State, 40 Fla. 527,
25 So. 144 (1899) (cross-examination allowed to contradict a witness who testified to having
derived teachings from a specified book, said book not containing such teachings, or containing matter substantially different from testimony) ; Ullrich v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 265 Ill.
338, 106 N.E. 828 (1914).

12. LaCount v. General Asbestos & Rubber Co., 184 S.C. 232, 192 S.E. 262 (1937) ; Goldstein and Shabat, Medical Trial Technique 44 (1942).
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Although, as has been shown, the majority rule is that books may be used
upon cross-examination only when the expert refers to them, a substantial
minority of states allow their use even though he does not say that they
corroborate his opinion and he does not rely upon them.13 There are,
however, three -qualifications placed upon this liberal rule. (1) The expert
must authenticate the book as a standard authority by acknowledging it
.as such.' 4 Generally, this is not a stumbling block for the expert usually
acknowledges the book, and several cases intimate that if he does not do
so, the examiner may call his own expert to do it.15 (This qualification is
also required in the states following the less stringent rule of reference
previously discussed.) (2) As in the states restricting the use of books,
the use must be relevant to the opinion given by the expert upon direct.' 6 For
example, the examiner will not be permitted to ask the witness if he agrees
with Sir William Osler's famous observation in one of his medical treatises
that it was remarkable how soon after a lawsuit patients suffering from
injuries caused byshock recovered their health.' 7 (3) The use is discretionary with the trial judge.18 However, permission seems to be readily
granted.
How the Books Are Used
Before a book may be used in any court a foundation for its use must be
laid. The extent of the foundation depends upon the jurisdiction in which
the book is used, but generally consists of establishing reliance upon a specific
book or books and establishing that the book sought to be used is a standard
authority in the expert's field.' 9 A sample line of questioning, assuming the
expert is a civil engineer and that he did not refer to a book upon direct,
would go: Examiner: "Mr. Expert, upon your direct examination you
stated that in your opinion the railroad was negligent in the construction
of its roadbed where the accident occurred because the angle of the slope of
the bed was off 20 degrees. Are you sustained in your opinion by any au13. Fed.: Reilly v. Pinkus,
UT.S. __, 70 S. Ct. 110 (1949) (Prior to this decision there
was a split of authority within the federal courts. This case, although dealing with an
administrative agency, may go a long way in unifying federal court practice); Victor
American Fuel Co. v. Tomljanovich, 232 Fed. 662 (1st Cir. 1916) ; Mutual Benefit Health &
Accid. Ass'n. v. Francis, 148 F. 2d 590 (8th Cir. 1945) ; Woelfe v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
103 F. 2d 417 (8th Cir. 1939); Ala.: City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188 So. 264
(1939) ; Barfield v. South Highlands Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 68 So. 30 (1915) ; Ark.:
Scullin v. Vining, 127 Ark. 124, 191 S.W. 924 (1917) ; Idaho: Osborn v. Cary, 28 Idaho 89,
152 Pac. 473 (1915); Ky.: Ky. Public Service Co. v. Topmiller, 204 Ky. 196, 263 S.W. 706
(1924) ; Mo.: Hemminghaus v. Ferguson,

-

Mo. ___,215 S.W. 2d 481 (1948); Wurst v.

American Car & Foundry Co., 103 S.W. 2d 6 (Mo. App. 1937); Mont.: State v. Bess, 60
Mont. 558, 199 Pac. 426 (1921); Nebr.: Fonda v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 138
Nebr. 262, 292 N.W. 712 (1940); N.H.: Laird v. Boston & M. R. Co., 80 N.H. 377, 117 At.
591 (1922) ; Ore.: Kern v. Pullen, 138 Ore. 222, 6 P. 2d 224 (1922) ; Tenn.: Byers v. Railroad, 94 Tenn. 345, 29 S.W. 128 (1895) ; Tex.: Bowles v. Bourbon, 219 S.W. 2d 779 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1949); Hicks v. Brown, 128 S.W. 2d 884 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Wash.: Cameron
v. Benefit Assoc. of Railway Employees, 6 Wash. 2d 440, 107 P. 2d 1096 (1940).
14. State v. Blackburn, 110 N.W. 275 (Iowa, 1907) ; Wurst v. American Car & Foundry
Co., 103 S.W. 2d 6 (Mo. App. 1937); Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Hancock, 59 S.W. 2d 313 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1933).
15. Oliverus v. Wicks, 107 Nebr. 821, 187 N.W. 73 (1922); Cameron Co. v. Downing,
147 S.W. 2d 963 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
16. Barfield v. South Highlands Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 68 So. 30 (1915) ; Stone v. Seattle,
33 Wash. 644, 74 Pac. 808 (1903).
17. Stone v. Seattle, 33 Wash. 644, 74 Pac. 808 (1903).
18. Woelfe v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 103 F. 2d 417 (8th Cir. 1939) ; Winters v. Rance,
125 Nebr. 577, 251 N.W. 167 (1933) ; Laird v. Boston & M.R. Co., 80 N.H. 377, 117 Atl. 591
(1922).
19. Cases cited notes 6 and 8 supra.
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thority?" If the witness answers that he is not sustained by any authority
with which he is familiar, the examiner has made a telling effect toward neutralizing the expert's direct testimony. Further attempts to question from
books will not be allowed because the admission forecloses the possibility of
invoking the rules of reference in order to make use of books.20 But if the
expert sustains his opinion by referring to a specific book or books generally,
the examiner must continue to lay a foundation. In a jurisdiction following
the strict version of the rule of referenceExaminer: "Mr. Expert, would
you please be more specific and state which book sustains your opinion." Then
in order to distinguish between reliance and corroboration, the expert should
be asked: "Did you rely upon that book in any way in reaching your
opinion'?"
The above questions need not be asked in those states which freely allow
the use of books on cross-examination. In those states, the examiner need
only establish that the book is a standard authority and that may be done by:
Examiner: "Mr. Expert, I have in my hand a copy of Ohms on Embankments and Slopes. Is it considered a standard book in your field?" After
the foundation has been laid, the examiner may use the book in several
ways. (1) He may read from it himself, asking the witness if he agrees
or disagrees with the extract read.2 1 (2) He may hand the book to the
expert, asking him to find wherein the book sustains his opinion and to
read the sustaining portion aloud.2 2 (3) Even more effective would be to
hand the book to the expert, point out wherein the book contradicts him,
and ask him to read the contradiction aloud.2 3 (4) A few jurisdictions
24
allow the examiner to read the contradictory extract directly to the jury,
and one jurisdiction allows calling one's own expert to read the book in
rebuttal. 25 However, the examiner is on safer ground if he addresses his
reading to the witness because of the rule that the books may not be used
for their substantive value, and any indication that the examiner was
trying to use the books for such a purpose may be grounds for a reversal. 26
Why the Restrictionon the Use of Books on Cross-Examination
If books were received as direct evidence for their substantive value
there would be no problem about using them during cross-examination.2 7
20. Woelfe v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 103 F. 2d 417 (8th Cir. 1939).
21. Barfield v. South Highlands Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 68 So. 30 (1915) (expert may be
asked if he concurs) ; Scullin v. Vining, 127 Ark. 124, 191 S.W. 924 (1917) (or if he agrees
or disagrees) ; Osborn v. Cary, 28 Idaho 89, 152 Pac. 473 (1915) ; Hess v. Lowrey, 122 Ind.
225, 23 N.E. 156 (1889); Ky. Public Service Co. v. Topmiller, 204 Ky. 196, 263 S.W. 706
(1924) (or asked whether "this is the true rule") ; Bowles v. Bourbon, 219 S.W. 2d 779 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1949) (and the excerpts read are not substantive evidence, but are merely to impeach the expert).
22. Osborn v. Cary, 28 Idaho 89, 152 Pac. 473 (1915) ("it is competent to test his knowledge and accuracy upon cross-examination by . . . having him read extracts from standard
authorities") ; Kersten v. Great Northern R. Co., 28 N.D. 3, 147 N.W. 787 (1914) (for "great
latitude should be allowed in the cross-examination of experts to test their credibility and
knowledge"). Contra: Hoffschlaeger Co. v. Fraga, 290 Fed. 146 (9th Cir. 1923).
23. See note 22 supra.
24. Scullin v. Vining, 127 Ark. 124, 191 S.W. 924 (1917) ; Piney v. Cahill, 48 Mich. 584,
12 N.W. 862 (1882) ; Madsen v. Obermann, 237 Iowa 461, 22 N.W. 2d 350 (1946).
25. Eggart v. State, 40 Fla. 527, 25 So. 144 (1899).
26. DeHaan v. Winter, 262 Mich. 192, 247 N.W. 151 (1933) (jury given wrong impression by questions framed from book held by counsel).
27. 6 Wigmore, Evidence §1690 (3rd ed. 1940). There is at the present time much agitation for the use of standard books as direct evidence. See Model Code of Evidence, Rule 529

(1942); Dana, Admission of Learned Treatises in Evidence (1945)

Wis. L. Rev. 455.
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However, only one state receives books for their substantive value pursuant
to common law; several states admit certain books for limited purposes
pursuant to statute; and all of the states recognize a limited use of books,
confining the use to facts of "notoriety," that is, life expectancy tables,
annuity tables, maps and history.2 8 The main reason for not admitting
books for testimonial purposes is that they constitute hearsay evidencethat is, the testimony of persons not under oath and subject to crossexamination. 2 9 Another stated reason is that books themselves are not
dependable evidence since knowledge in the field of the sciences changes
rapidly and may have actually changed between the publication of the
books and their use in court. 30 However, if this latter reason were carried to
its logical conclusion it would also operate to cut off the testimony of the
experts since they to are testifying to changing facts.
The same reasons for excluding books as direct evidence have been
carried over into the field of cross-examination. It is thought that in crossexamination the examiner would be doing indirectly what he could not
do directly; that is, place books in evidence for their substantive value. 81
Inroads upon this rule are made, of course, when it is established in some
manner that the expert relied upon books in reaching his opinion.3 2
The courts which allow the use of books during cross-examination do so
upon the premise that the expert's original opinion is based largely upon
hearsay, and, therefore, it is only fair to use the same source of hearsay in
cross-examining him. The leading case expounding this view is Laird v.
33
Boston Railroad,
wherein the New Hampshire court said that since the
expert really testifies from his recollection of hearsay he may be crossexamined to test his familiarity with that hearsay. Such testing is admissible for it is a factor which may qualify or discredit the expert's opinion.
The court came close to saying that the use of books on cross-examination
was not hearsay at all because the issue was "not whether the book states
the true opinion of the author," but was whether the expert "honestly
and intelligently read and applied" his knowledge in reaching an opinion.
However, the plunge was not taken, for the court concluded that "the
whole field of hearsay knowledge is open to such investigation because of
the nature of the opinion" given by the expert.
A Suggested Solution
Actually, the use of books on cross-examination is not hearsay for the hearsay rule operates to exclude statements made out of court at a time when the
maker of the statement was not under oath and was not subject to crossexamination only when the statement is offered for the truth contained thereContra: Grubb, Proposed "Learned Treatises" Rule (1946) Wis. L. Rev. 81. The comment
to Rule 529 takes the position that the use of books as direct evidence "will eliminate all
prohibitions upon the use of a treatise for purposes of cross-examination which would not
equally apply to the use of testimony or proposed available testimony of another expert for
the same purpose." For an example of a statutory provision allowing books as evidence, see
Sarkar's, Evidence (India and Burma) 587 (7th ed. 1946).
28. 6 Wigmore, E'vidence §1693 (3rd ed. 1940). Dean Wigmore says that two jurisdictions allow use pursuant to common law. However, the cases of one of the jurisdictions,
Iowa, do not sustain that position. See Cronk v. Railroad, 123 Iowa 349, 98 N.W. 884 (1904).
29. 6 id. at §1690.
30. Ibid.
31. Cases cited notes 6 and 8 supra.
32. Ibid.
33. 80 N.H. 377, 117 Afd. 591 (1922).

